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Jouard: Constitutional Law - A Constitutional Right of Access to State-He
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A Constitutional Right of Access to State-Held
Information. Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785
(Wyo. 1983).
On July 31, 1981, the Sheridan Chief of Police notified the Sheridan
Press and other media sources that he would no longer allow them to inspect certain records maintained by the department.' The police chief advised all media representatives that in the future news releases would be
prepared and disseminated by the department. Weekly news conferences
would be held, and information regarding ongoing investigations would be
released only with specific approval. 2 Among those records to which the
police chief denied access included 3 the "rolling log ' 4 and "case reports." '5
The method the police chief chose to disseminate information regarding police activity was unacceptable to Sheridan Newspapers, Inc.,
publisher of the Sheridan Press. Pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records
Act (WPRA),6 the newspaper made a written request to the chief of police
for a written statement of his reasons for denying access to department
records.' The police chief failed to respond to the newspaper's request as
required under the WPRA.8 Subsequently, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc., instituted an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the police logs, jail
logs, and the case reports be declared public records under the WPRA. 9
The judgment of the trial court permitted inspection of the department's jail log, reports of traffic accident investigations, and all citations
and complaints. 10 The court determined that the rolling log and the case
reports were public records," but that the press did not have a "statutory
1. Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 787 (Wyo. 1983).
2. Brief for Appellee at 2, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785
(Wyo. 1983).
3. Id. at 4. The police chief's denial of access to police records included recorded complaints
from citizen-victims or citizen-informants.
4. 660 P.2d at 789. The "rolling log" was also referred to by the court as the daily log. It was
described by the court as a chronological index of all reports and complaints received by
the department. The record includes a case number, the type of case, a brief description
of the event, the name of the person reporting the matter, and the officer assigned to the
case. Id.
5. Id.A case report may detail a matter from complaint through investigation to arrest.
Case reports may contain, in part, investigative material.
6. Wyo. STAT. §§ 16-4-201 to 16-4-205 (1977).
7. Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-203 (e) (1977) provides:
If the custodian denies access to any public record, the applicant may request a written statement of the grounds of denial. The statement shall cite the law or regulation
under which access is denied and it shall be issued forthwith to the applicant.
8. 660 P.2d at 789. The chief of police failed to furnish any "factual basis" or reasons for
closing the records when responding to the newspaper's request for an explanation of the
closure. At trial the police chief indicated a number of reasons for the denial of access. He
suggested that the closure of access was motivated in part by the fact that a news report
was at variance with a prepared news release, and that he wanted to protect the privacy
of certain persons arrested by the department. The chief of police also suggested that the
closure was made in order to prevent certain reporters from breaking the rules and procedures developed by the department to disseminate information. Id. at 793.
9. Brief for Appellant, Appendix at 3-4, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660
P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1983).
10. 660 P.2d at 790.
11. WYO. STAT. § 164-201(a) (v) (1977) defines public records as follows:
(v) 'public records' when not otherwise specified includes any paper, correspondence, form, book, photograph, photostat, film, microfilm, sound recording, map drawing or other document, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, and including all copies thereof, that have been made by the
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or constitutional right of access" to inspect those records. 12 Both the City
of Sheridan and Sheridan Newspapers, Inc., appealed the judgment of the
trial court. The newspaper maintained on appeal that the "blanket closure"
of access to the rolling log and case reports was unlawful, and that the
press had a statutory's and constitutional' 4 right to routinely inspect those
records, subject to the police chief s right of withdrawal under the
WPRA.' 5 In addition, the newspaper argued that the WPRA imposes upon
the custodian of the public record the burden of showing why a record is not
available for inspection.' 6 The newspaper contended that the police chief
failed to meet this burden.
The City of Sheridan appealed from a portion of the trial court's order
which it argued "engrafted" upon the WPRA "additional requirements"
beyond those imposed by the WPRA which the custodian of the record
must satisfy to effect withdrawal of a record from public inspection. 1 7 The
City objected to the following requirements contained in the trial court's
judgment:
(1) any exclusion must be on a "case-by-case" basis, and
(2) "such exclusion shall only be on a very limited basis", and
(3) "only upon extraordinary circumstances", and
(4) "for good cause shown", and,
(5) "then only for such limited time as may be necessary."' 8
In an opinion written by Justice Rose, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the press has a constitutional and statutory right of access to the
rolling log and case reports and that the chief of police cannot justify a
blanket withdrawal of access to those records on the basis that they may at
times contain exempt material. 19 On the appeal brought by the City, the
State of Wyoming and any * * *municipalities * * or received by them in connection with the transaction of public business, except as privileged or confidential by law.
12. 660 P.2d at 790.
13. Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-203 (1977) provides, in relevant part:
(a) The custodian of any public records shall allow any person the right of inspection of such records or any portion thereof except on one (1) or more of the
following grounds or as provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this section:
(iii) The inspection is prohibited by rules promulgated by the supreme
court or by the order of any court of record.
(b) The custodian may deny the right of inspection of the following records,
unless otherwise provided by law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the public interest:
(i) Records of investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information
or security procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, city attorney, the
attorney general, police department or any investigatory files compiled
for any other law enforcement or prosecution purposes;
(v) Interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be
available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency.
14. Wyo. CoNST. art. 1, § 6 due process provisions, and, Wyo. CONST. art. 1 § 20 Freedomof-Speech and press provisions and U.S. CONST. amend, XIV. In Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931), the Court held that the first amendment was applicable to the
states by reason of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
15. WYO. STAT. §§ 16-4-201 to -205 (1977).
16. 660 P.2d at 790.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 796.
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court held that the trial court's order did not specify requirements for
withdrawal 20of a record from public access that were not contemplated by
the WPRA.
I.

THE COURT'S OPINION

A. The ConstitutionalRight of Access
In Sheridan Newspapers, the court recognized a constitutional "right
of access" to records maintained by the police department. 21 The court
found this constitutional right to be embodied in the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution,2 2 and parallel Wyoming
constitutional provisions. 23 The court acknowledged the importance of according constitutional protection to a free press. Quoting from Branzburg
v. Hayes24 the court explained: "The press has a preferred position in our
constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen
apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the people's right to
know. The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the
people .... ,25 The court in Sheridan Newspapers suggested that the "constitutional guarantee of a free press 'assures the maintenance of our
political system and open society' ",26 and "secures 'the paramount public
interest in a free flow of information to the public concerning public officials'." 2 7 The court also recognized a right of the public to receive information. 25 Implicitly, the court reasoned that the free flow of information
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
necessarily includes the
29
right of access to certain public records.
The Sheridan Newspapers court made it clear that the constitutional
right of access recognized is not absolute. The court cited with authority30
the proposition that the first amendment does not grant the press a constitutional right of access not available to the public generally. 31 The court
20. Id. at 800.
21. Id. at 794.
22. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press......

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in relevant part:
"[nor] shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."
23. Id. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 20 provides:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right......
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 6 states:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.'

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972).
660 P.2d at 794 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 721 (1972)).
Id. (quoting Time Inc. v. Hill, 885 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964)).
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969).
29. The court never directly addressed the issue of access; rather the court simply implies a
right of access from the noted protections afforded the press in the first amendment.
30. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
850 (1974); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325 (Wyo. 1979).
31. 660 P.2d at 790, n.10.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 17
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

added that the constitutional right of access is to be balanced with relevant
competing-interest considerations, 82 and is subject to "statutory restrictions" promulgated by the legislature in the public interest.88
The court in Sheridan Newspapers cited with approval the decision in
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston84 in determining the nature
and reach of the constitutional right of access. 5 In Houston Chronicle, the
Texas court, supporting the Chronicle's right of access to certain police
records,6 said: "In determining the reach of this constitutional right of access it is necessary to weigh and evaluate legitimate competing
interests."' 7 Legitimate interests may include the public's right to know,
concerning crime in the community,88 as well as the state interest in denying access to materials if it would unduly interfere with law enforcement efforts or jeopardize due process considerations in a criminal prosecution. 9
In SheridanNewspapers the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged
the authority of the legislature to enact laws, in the public interest, inhibiting public access to public records in certain situations. 40 The court
cautioned that such legislation may not "deny the people's right to be informed." ' 4' The SheridanNewspapers court did not, however, attempt to
farther define the parameters within which the legislature could deny access to public records and essentially failed to articulate any standards
governing permissible state restrictions.
In summary, the court in Sheridan Newspapers determined that: 1) a
constitutional right of access exists; 42 2) the nature of the right is to be
determined by balancing the competing interests involved; 48 and 3) that the
legislature may enact laws restricting access to public records in the public
interest"-although the court failed to set forth any specific standards to
govern such legislative action.
B. Statutory Constructionof the Wyoming Public Records Act
In SheridanNewspapers the court cited a number of cases to illustrate
what the court has termed its "historical disclosure position."' 45 In Laramie
River ConservationCouncil v. Dirgenthe court stated that with regard to
the WPRA, the policy of the state is disclosure-not secrecy. 46 Other
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 795.
Id.
531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ. App. 1975).
660 P.2d at 795.
531 S.W.2d at 179-180. The Texas court upheld the Houston Chronicle'sright of access to
the Houston "Police Blotter," "Show-Up Sheet," and "Arrest Sheet." The information
maintained in those records included the arrestee's social security number, name, age,
race, sex, occupation, address, his physical condition, the place of the arrest, charges filed, the court in which the case was filed and the names of the arresting officers.
37. Id. at 186.
38. Id.
39. 660 P.2d at 795.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.

45. Id. at 793.
46. 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1977).
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examples offered by the court included Williams v. Stafford in which the
court addressed a court-closure issure, 47 and Record Times, Inc. v. Town of
Wheatland, where the court construed
a state statute requiring
48
municipalities to publish town bills.
Consistent with its historical disclosure position, and in light of the constitutional questions involved, the court in SheridanNewspapers ruled that
statutes providing public access of public records should be construed
liberally. 49 Conversely, exemptions from disclosure should be construed
narrowly.50
The philosophy of disclosure and the rules of construction set forth by
the court provided the framework against which the court construed the
WPRA. With this framework in mind the Sheridan Newspapers court examined precedent in other jurisdictions where the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)51 has been construed. In Mead Data Central,Inc. v.
United States of Department of Air Force, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stated that, "the focus of FOIA is information, not
documents, and an agency cannot justify withholding an entire document
simply by showing that it contains some exempt material."' " The Sheridan
Newspapers court also cited NorthernCal. PolicePracticesProjectv. Craig
where the California Court of Appeals stated: "The PRA [Public Records
Act] is modeled upon the Freedom of Information Act" 5 and that, "the
PRA has been judicially interpreted to require segregation of exempt from
non-exempt materials contained in a single document."" The Sheridan
Newspapers court cited with approval the reasoning embodied in the FOIA
cases, 55 embracing broad disclosure, and then construed the WPRA in a
similar fashion.5s
The court in SheridanNewspapers made it clear that the custodian of a
public record may not withdraw entire categories of records, 7 or any
records, without addressing the question whether withdrawal of individual
records violates provisions of the WPRA.58 The court added, recognizing
the reasoning in the FOIA cases, that a particular record may not be
withdrawn "where it is possible for the sensitive information to be excised
and the balance of the record made available to public inspection." 9
47. 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979). The court in Williams cited Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49 (1978), for the proposition that access to court proceedings
should be limited only under exceptional circumstances. Id. at 325.
48. 650 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1982). The court construed the provisions of Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-110
(1977), a statute which speaks to a municipality's obligation to publish town bills, to require the Town of Wheatland to publish the individual salaries of its employees.
49. 660 P.2d at 794.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90 Cal.App.3d 116, 123, 153 Cal.Rptr. 173, 178 (1979). Craig involved an action brought
by a civil liberties organization against the California State Highway Patrol, seeking
disclosure of information regarding the training practices of the state highway patrol.
Id.
See supratext accompanying notes 51-54. See also Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 325 (1976); State ex
reL Stephen v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982).
660 P.2d at 797.
E.g., law enforcement records.
660 P.2d at 795, 796.
Id. at 797.
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In order for the custodian of a public record to effectuate withdrawal of
a public record under the WPRA the SheridanNewspapers court determined that he must: 1) determine whether the individual record in question
falls within statutory exemptions provided under the WPRA;60 and, 2) if it
does, he must weigh the competing interests involving the public's right to
know against the perceived harm to the public from disclosure; 61 and finally, 3) if he chooses to withdraw
records from public inspection he must pro62

vide reasons for doing

So.

In the event of court action, the custodian must satisfy the court that
statutory withdrawal, in light of the public interest, outweighs the public
policy favoring disclosure.6 3 If the custodian fails to give adequate reasons
for withdrawal, or fails to give any reasons at all, the party denied inspection may force automatic disclosure of the record.64
The Sheridan Newspapers court interpreted that portion of the trial
court's order, objected to by the City, which would require a showing of
"extraordinary circumstances" and "good cause" as well as providing
limitations on the time in which a custodian may effect withdrawal, as
simply specifying the conditions contemplated by the WPRA6 provisions
calling for the exercise of discretion by the records custodian. 1
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

A. A ConstitutionalRight of Access to State-Held Information
The court in Sheridan Newspapers declared that there is a constitutional right of access within the applicable freedom-of-the-press and due
process provisions of the federal and state constitutions. 6 Noticeably, the
court fails to provide any persuasive authority for its finding. The court articulated the importance of a free and unrestrained press and of constitutional protection from prior restraint.6 7 The Sheridan Newspapers court
then implied a "right of6access"
embodied in the first amendment freedom8
of-the-press provisions.
Interestingly, a majority of the United States Supreme Court Justices
have been reluctant to recognize a constitutional right of access outside the
scope of criminal trials.6 9 In Zemel v. Rusk the Supreme Court noted that
"the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information. ' '7 0 In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., in which broadcast
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra note 15.
660 P.2d at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
660 P.2d at 794.
Id.

68. Id.
69. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, U.S. _
102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982).
70. 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). The appellant in Zemel argued that a ban on travel to Cuba, in effect, interfered with his first amendment right to acquaint himself with our government's
foreign policy. Id.
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media sought access to a troubled section of the county jail, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for a fragmented Court, noted that although there is an
"undoubted right to gather the news" the first amendment does not "com7' 1
pel others-private persons or governments-to supply information.
Although the Court was badly fragmented in Houchins, one commentator
suggested the seven participating Justices did agree on two basic propositions: first, the press has no constitutional right of access not available to
the public in general;72 and second, even assuming a constitutional right of
access were recognized the Court has a "limited institutional capacity" to
enforce a right of access to government-held information.78 Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart, who have been called the "major architects"
of the Court's position on access issues,' 4 have both emphasized the difficulty in deriving standards for governing the disclosure of state-held information, and have suggested
that perhaps the access question should be left to
'
"political processes. "'
The right of access issue was also addressed by the Supreme Court in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.' The Court in Richmond held that
"absent an overriding interest articulated in findings" the first amendment requires that "the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public." 77 There was no opinion to which a majority of the Justices
subscribed but seven Justices did recognize the right of access to be embodied in the first amendment. 7' The opinions in Richmond once again
reflected a badly fragmented Court,79 and the extent to which the holding
extends to other areas of state government remains uncertain.' 0
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
right of access in SheridanNewspapers, it did not establish any clear constitutional standards governing the disclosure of government-held information. The reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to recognize such
a right has been due, in part, to the difficulty in deriving appropriate standards and the desire to avoid confrontations with the other branches of
government that might arise in an attempt to judicially enforce such a
71. 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). Chief Justice Berger delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment while
Stevens, Brennan, and Powell dissented from the plurality. Justices Marshall and
Blackmun took no part in the case.
72. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIoNAL LAw Ch. 12 (1979 Supp.).
73. Id. at 68.
74. See Note, The FirstAmendment Right of Access to Government-Held Information:A reEvaluation After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERs L. REV. 293,
311-22 (1982).

75. See supra note 72. Justice Stevens dissenting in Houchins suggests that the Court need
not "evolve standards governing disclosure of information." Rather, he suggests that the
Court's task is "more limited, more familiar, and peculiarly judicial-to determine that a
constitutional violation has taken place and to select an appropriate remedy." TRIBE,
supra note 72, at 70.

76. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
77. Id. at 581.
78. Note, supra note 74, at 311-22.

79. Chief Justice Burger authored the plurality opinion and Justice White and Stevens filed
concurring opinions. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.

80. See, e.g., Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Forward:Freedom of Ezpremsion in the
Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 21 (1980). See generally, The Supreme Court 1979
Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 149-59 (1980).
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right. Difficult policy issues must be addressed in developing appropriate
standards to govern the disclosure of state-held information.8 1
A. Statutory Restriction on the Right of Access
The court in Sheridan Newspapers acknowledged the authority of the
legislature to promulgate legislation, in the public interest, to restrain
news-gathering activities.8 2 The court did not attempt to define the permissible scope of such legislation but simply suggested that statutory
be kept inrestraints may "not ... unlawfully deny the people's right to
8
formed," risking a first or fourteenth amendment violation. 3
While the Wyoming Supreme Court failed to define the permissible
scope of state legislation in the access area, a number of different approaches have been suggested. One commentator has suggested that a
balancing test might be employed utilizing a less-restrictive alternative approach. 84 Under this test state action which infringes first amendment
rights is permissible only if a legitimate state goal cannot be achieved by a
less-restrictive alternative."5
Another suggested approach employs what is termed an "incompatibility test."8 6 Utilizing this test, citizens have a presumed right of access to information held by the government, and the burden is placed upon
the government to show that a disclosure would be incompatible with the
normal activity of that particular institution. 7 This test requires that
restrictions on access be narrowly drawn and non-discriminatory to avoid a
constitutional violation. 88 A final suggested approach is that employing a
two-part "content-conduct" test. 9 Under the first part of the test, emphasizing the content of the information sought, denial of access to information will be upheld only if disclosure of the information would "threaten
the public good or welfare." 90 Under the second part of the test, emphasizing conduct, denial of access will be upheld only if the "means of gathering
information significantly interfere with either the constitutional rights of
others or a compelling government interest." 91 Once again, the application
of this test would require the state to carry the burden justifying a denial of
access.9 2
The relative advantages and disadvantages of each suggested approach
are beyond the scope of this Note. It is clear, however, that a common
theme runs throughout each approach. The state should bear the burden of
justifying any denial of access to state-held information.
81. See supra note 75.
82. 660 P.2d at 795.
83. Id.
84. See Note, The Rights of the Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1505, 1521 (1974).
85. Id.
86. Note, The FirstAmendment Right to GatherState-Held Information, 89 YALE L. J. 923,
936 (1980).
87. Id. at 937.

88. Id.

89. Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather InformationUnder the First Amendment, 12
Loy. L.A.L. REV.357, 382 (1979).
90. Id. at 393.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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The same commentator who has advocated the use of the "contentconduct" test in access cases has suggested that a denial of access to stateheld information operates as the "functional equivalent" of prior
restraint.98 Consequently, it is argued that statutory restrictions on access
should be subject to the level of scrutiny employed in cases involving prior
restraints." The argument is premised upon the notion that the press cannot publish information it has no opportunity to gather.9 5 As a practical
matter the press has been effectively restrained from publishing state-held
information. It is suggested further that a denial of a right to gather information "could be the most insidious form of prior restraint" since
"members of the press are unaware of what they might be publishing." 96
Still another commentator has argued that the concept of what may be
termed a prior restraint could plausibly be extended to a "denial of press
access to newsworthy events and records." 9
The Sheridan Newspapers court cited a great number of cases which
have held that "any system of prior restraints" bears a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." 98 This is not to suggest that every
prior restraint is unconstitutional per se. 99 The United States Supreme
Court has never formulated precise constitutional standards dealing with
prior restraints but the "distaste for censorship" is deeply rooted in
American law. 100 As a result prior restraints have been subject to the most
"exacting scrutiny. '"101
The practical effect of a denial of access to state-held information clearly imposes a prior restraint on the publication of that material. A denial of
access, then, should also be subject to exacting scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has noted that it is the character of the right involved that establishes what standard should be applied in determining
where an "individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins."10 2 A
free flow of information is necessary to the governing powers of the people
and is the very foundation upon which democratic theory rests. 103 In light
of the fundamental nature of the right involved, the state should be permitted to restrict access to state-held information only upon a showing of a
the restriction in question is narrowly
compelling state interest and 1that
0
tailored to serve that interest. '
93. Comment, supra note 89, at 364.
94. Comment, supra note 89, at 382.
95. Comment, supra note 89, at 363-64.
96. Id.
97. Blasi, Toward a Theory of PriorRestraint:The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L. REV.1, 15
n.17 (1981).
98. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.

58, 70 (1963).

99. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
100. 16A AM. JuR. 2d CoNs'TrrTuTioNAL LAw § 498 (1979).
101. Id.
102. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
103. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. Globe Newspaper, Co. v. Supenor Court,__ U.S. -. , 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982). The
Court in Globe stated that, "where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the
right of access in order to inhibit disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown
that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 2620.
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B. Custodial Discretion Under the Wyoming PublicRecords Act
The SheridanNewspapers court outlined the procedures and standards
which must be followed in order for a custodian of public records to effect
withdrawal under the WPRA. 10 5 Briefly, the majority interprets the
WPRA to require the custodian, in the exercise of his discretion, to determine whether the record falls within statutorily designated categories,
and, if it does, to determine whether effecting withdrawal of a record is in
the public interest. 0 6 Consequently, the custodian must exercise his discretion twice.
Chief Justice Rooney argued in his concurring opinion, with regard to
the appeal brought by the newspaper, that the custodian is required under
the WPRA to exercise his discretion only in determining whether the
record in questions falls within a statutory category which may be permissibly withheld from public inspection.' 0 7 The custodian need not exerthe
cise further discretion-if the record falls within a statutory exemption
legislature has determined that withdrawal is in the public interest. 10 8 The
Chief Justice argued that the statute provides in plain language the extent
to which the custodian is to exercise his discretion. The custodian may deny
the right to inspect police records of investigations, intelligence reports,
and security procedures, on the ground that disclosure would be contrary
to the public interest. 10 9
In his dissenting opinion with regard to the appeal brought by the City
of Sheridan, the Chief Justice strenuously objected to "the dicta in the majority opinion" that "would extend by judicial fiat the perimeters of the
right of access beyond that specifically set forth in the act."' 10 The Chief
Justice referred to the majority's acceptance of the trial court's order as
specifying conditions contemplated by the WPRA provisions calling for
custodial discretion."' Arguing that the statute does not require a showing
of "extraordinary circumstances," "good cause shown," or "limitations on
requirements of the act
time for denial," the Chief Justice stated that the
"are not to be enlarged by judicial legislation." 112
The more plausible interpretation of custodial discretion under the
WPRA is that offered by the Chief Justice. The plain language of the
statute, asserted by Chief Justice Rooney, requires that the custodian of a
public record need only exercise his discretion to determine whether the
record in question falls within a statutory exemption. 1 8 It is unclear
whether the majority has in fact judicially legislated additional requirements which a custodian must entertain before effecting withdrawal
under the WPRA. Perhaps the existence of the constitutional claim involved is due, in part, to the curious construction of the WPRA rendered by the
majority. By adopting the order of the trial court the Sheridan court only
confused the issue.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
660 P.2d at 798-99.
Id. at 802 (Rooney, C.J., concurring).
See supra note 13.
660 P.2d at 802.
Id. at 801.
Id. (Rooney, .J., dissenting).
Id. at 803.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICING ATTORNEY

The failure of the SheridanNewspapers court to establish any discernible standard regarding the permissible scope of statutory restriction in the
access area has left the validity of WPRA provisions providing for exemptions from disclosure in doubt. Although the court spoke in grand and eloquent terms of the import of first amendment freedoms, not once did the
court suggest that the WPRA provisions which allow the custodian to permissibly withhold a record from public inspection might be constitutionally
suspect. By adopting a standard employing strict scrutiny, as has been suggested in this Note, certainly many of the exemptions from disclosure
within the WPRA are subject to constitutional attack. In addition to a
statutory right of access defined under the WPRA, after Sheridan
Newspapers the attorney seeking to force disclosure of state-held information now has a recognized constitutional claim.
The SheridanNewspapersdecision is important in another respect. The
court defines the duty of the custodian of a public record who desires to
withdraw from public inspection." 4 The court requires the custodian to
determine whether the record falls within designated categories, and then5
to determine whether withdrawal of the record is in the public interest."
Finally, the court's decision requires the custodian to perform the burdensome task of excising exempt material from non-exempt material
whenever it is possible to do so. 116 Significantly, the SheridanNewspapers
court relied to some extent on cases interpreting FOIA for guidance in construing the WPRA." 7 FOIA was enacted to serve citizen interest by8 requiring disclosure of information requested of the executive branch."
Similar to the WPRA, FOIA provides for certain exemptions from
disclosure." 9 If an applicant's request for information is denied, he may
first appeal to the agency head, 20 and then to a United States district
may force
court. 121 Both the WPRA and FOIA provide that a court 22
withheld.

disclosure of a record which has been impermissibly

The Sheridan Newspapers court acknowledged the principles of
disclosure underlying FOIA, and readily construed WPRA provisions in a
114. 660 P.2d at 796.
115. Id.
116. See Northern Calif. Police Practices Project v. Craig, 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 153 Cal. Rptr.
173, 178, where the court states: "Undoubtedly the requirement of segregation casts a
tangible burden on governmental agencies and the judiciary. Nothing less will suffice
however, if the underlying legislative policy of the PRA favoring disclosure is to be implemented faithfully."
117. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 74 at 296.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1976), provides for exemptions of the following categories, (1) information authorized by the executive to be kept secret in the interest of national security or
foreign policy; (2) internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) information
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets; (5) interagency and
intraagency communications; (6) personnel, medical, and other files, disclosure of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) certain investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (8) certain reports prepared for agencies
which supervise financial institutions; and (9) geological data concerning wells.

120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (iii) (1982).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).

122. Id.; Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-203(f) (1977).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 17
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

similar fashion. In doing so, the Wyoming Supreme Court has indicated
that FOIA cases may provide fertile precedent for cases arising under the
WPRA. The attorney on either side of the access issue is provided with an
abundant source of case law with which to prepare his case.
CONCLUSION

The Sheridan Newspapers decision is important in a number of
respects. First, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
right of access to state-held information embodied in the first amendment.
The court, however, failed to establish constitutional standards to govern
such a right. The failure to define a standard defining permissible state
regulation in the access area has left the constitutional validity of WPRA
exemptions from disclosure in doubt. A number of possible approaches in
establishing such a standard have been suggested. A free flow of information is fundamental to democratic government, and any state law restricting or impinging upon this right of access should be subject to strict
scrutiny. Finally, the Sheridan Newspapers decision indicates that FOIA
cases may provide authority for future WPRA cases.
STEPHEN JOUARD
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